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Introduction
On June 23, 2016, the United Kingdom (UK) voted to leave the European Union (EU). However, at this time there is considerable uncertainty about what will happen, when it will happen, and how it will happen. The only certainty is the vote to leave. Uncertainty hovers over the post-vote landscape of a new relation of the UK with the EU and therefore with other countries. Nonetheless, there is consensus that the UK and the world (given that the UK is the fifth largest global economy ) will be poorer, i.e. economic growth will decline as a result of Brexit than if the UK had voted to remain. The debate is by how much, and the quantification of such impact on the Caribbean. So far, this debate has been qualitative.
In this report, we present estimates of the direct and indirect macroeconomic impact of the leave vote Brexit(v) on the Caribbean for the period 2016 and 2017 in terms of economic growth, exports, tourism, and remittances. The six Caribbean countries (denominated as C6) included in this study are three tourism countries (The Bahamas, Barbados and Jamaica) and three commodity countries (Guyana, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago). We find the estimated quantitative impact of Brexit(v) to be very small if not negligible.
Brexit(v)
Leading up to the referendum vote on whether the UK should leave the EU, debate was marked by hyperbole on both sides, as is typical surrounding major policy decisions. For the no-"remainers", predictions abounded of dire economic consequences for the UK and the world economy. The UK and the world would plunge into recession. For the yes-"leavers", it appears the argument of dire economic consequences did not resonate. Rather, what reigned were arguments that the UK would be "free at last (from EU bureaucrats)", monies destined to the EU 1 would instead divert to the National Health Service, and there would be no more immigrants. Unexpectedly, the leavers won.
The immediate consequence appeared to substantiate the remainers' arguments. What is the probable evolution of the UK's economy for the next two years? There is a range of forecasts from deep recession to a boom. We take as our baseline the conservative projections in the IMF Update (July 2016), which forecasts reduced economic growth of the UK and USA in relation to their pre-Brexit(v) forecasts (WEO April 2016). Figure 1 shows the pre and post Brexit(v) forecasted growth rates. The pound sterling devaluation with respect to the USA dollar has been about 10 percent ( Figure 2 ) and like the Update, we assume it settles at that rate.
1 An example of exaggeration is that the "leavers" claimed was £55 million a day based on claimed £17.8 billion per year was transferred to the EU. But with the rebate-effectively deducted at the source transfers are less £12.9 billion, that represents a tenth of National Health Service' s annual budget, and is equivalent to £200 per capita and £35 million per day. 2 The four measures announced consist of: a cut in official interest rates to 0.25% from 0.5%, plans to pump an additional £60bn in electronic cash into the economy to buy government bonds, extending the existing quantitative easing (QE) programme to £435bn in total; another £10bn in electronic cash to buy corporate bonds from firms "making a material contribution to the UK economy; £100bn of new funding to banks to help them pass on the base rate cut. Under this new "term funding scheme" the Bank will create new money to provide loans to banks at interest rates close to the base rate of 0.25%. The scheme will charge a penalty rate if banks do not lend. This represents -0.11 percentage points for tourism countries and -0.07 percentage points for commodity countries (see Figure 4) . Although it is a small effect, the absolute size of the effect is substantial within the context of countries forecasted to have low or negative growth rates. Source: Estimates from a Structural Vector AutoRegression using data from IMF WEO Update July 2016
We now turn towards the estimates of the impacts on three main channels of influence: trade, tourism and remittances.
Trade
It is important to keep in mind that nothing structural has changed yet in the Caribbean's relationship with either the UK or EU due to Brexit(v). Only whence a new relationship is negotiated, perhaps two years or more from now, will it change. 4 The Caribbean's relationship with the EU on trade will continue unchanged until then, through the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), and associated development support.
Further, the direct trade in goods between the Caribbean and the UK has been falling during the last three decades. Exports to the UK were a third of total exports and imports from the UK were about a quarter of total imports in mid-sixties but since then both have fallen to less than 2 percent by the 2000s (see Figure 5 that provides individual countries on reliance of exports to the UK). Using the IMF's Brexit(v) scenario and an elasticity of Caribbean exports to the UK of 0.55 reveals a marginal impact-either exports as a percentage of GDP or in USA dollar terms-on Caribbean exports to the UK (Figure 6 ). The decline in exports as a percent of GDP is estimated to be an average of 0.004 percentage points (equivalent to a fall of 0.3 percentage points in terms of USA dollars). The largest decline in terms of exports to GDP is for Guyana but even that is only 0.016 percentage points. The impact on Caribbean exports is, therefore, negligible.
3 These results are based on three separate SVAR; available on request from the authors. 4 Development assistance, another issue often raised regarding the impact of Brexit, will not be affected until Brexit actually occurs. 
Services-Tourism 5
Tourism, as claimed in recent headlines 6 , is uniquely exposed to the short-term economic effects of Brexit(v). This is due to the devaluation of the Pound Sterling against the US Dollar rate, and consequent decline in relation to all dollar-related currencies in the Caribbean. This implies that holidays in the Caribbean have become more expensive for the British-already the average nominal cost of a week on the beach in the Caribbean was more expansive than other destinations around the world; add to this a lower outflow from the UK of tourist due to the UK's forecasted lower economic growth.
However, tourism from the UK was already declining (see Figure 7) as a share of total world tourism. Arrivals from the UK as a percent of total tourist arrivals had fallen from about 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 
Remittances
Remittances are important for Caribbean countries as a percent of GDP and in their role in reducing the current account of the balance of payments. Large remittances reflect that the Caribbean countries are marked as exporters of qualified labour, particularly teachers, nurses and other health professionals rather than uneducated migrants. However, geographic proximity and a common language have increasingly made the United States and Canada a preferred destination rather than the UK (United Nations, 2006). As a consequence, remittances from the UK have fallen as a percent of total remittances. Dependence, as ,measured by remittances from the UK as a percent of total remittances, ranges from 23 percent for Barbados, 14 percent for Jamaica, 6 percent for Trinidad and 7 The increase in hate crimes against immigrants in the UK post Brexit vote may further accentuate this shift. Tobago, to 5 percent for Guyana. For Suriname, it is insignificant. The impact of Brexit(v) on remittances from the UK, as percentage points of GDP and in terms of US Dollars, is given in Figure 10 . In terms of the ratio of remittances to GDP, the decline is 0.012 percentage points for Jamaica, and 0.003 percentage points for Barbados and Guyana. The impact on Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago is effectively zero. The estimated impact of Brexit on remittances is therefore negligible. Source: Authors, using changes in remitting countries' GDPs on changes in remittances elasticity of 0.54. This is the high end of estimations of the elasticity that range from a low value of 0.08, mid-point value of 0.31 to high value of 0.54 estimations that differ from different model specifications. consequences during 2016 and 2017 on remittances, exports, or tourism, and therefore no significant effect on economic growth. This follows largely due to the Caribbean having dramatically reduced its direct economic dependence on the UK since gaining independence from the UK as a colony.
Although the impact on economic growth is small for the Caribbean countries in percentage point terms, for those that were already forecasted to have low-to-negative economic growth the absolute effect of Brexit(v) is considerable. Furthermore, firms that export their products exclusively to the UK, or that depend solely on UK tourists, and households that depend critically on remittances from the UK, may face a reality opposite to our conclusions, which have a macroeconomic focus. 
